PhantomTac: Hijacking Robotic Tactile Systems with Deploy-and-forget Tags
PhantomTac: Hijacking Robotic Tactile Systems with Deploy-and-forget Tags
This research introduces PhantomTac, a physical-layer security attack on magnetic tactile sensors used in robotic manipulation. By attaching a thin, battery-free magnetic tag to an object, an attacker can spoof force readings and compromise robotic control. The attack is 'deploy-and-forget' and can be concealed with a barcode sticker. Real-world evaluations on robotic arms show over 95% attack success rate under certain conditions, with a proposed defense mechanism based on multimodal consistency.
Source: arXiv Robotics — research abstracts · Read original article ↗
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What the source reports
Publisher-reported claims, with original evidence. These results have not been independently verified by RoboSignal.
Reported numbers
grasping-position offset
8
View original evidence
ss rate exceeding 95% when the grasping-position offset is bounded within 8 mm. Finally, based on the limitations of existing anti-magnetic interference mechanisms, we propose a multimodal-consistency defense mechanism to mitigate such physical-layer security threats.
Open source S6tag thickness
≈0.5
View original evidence
physical loophole called PhantomTac in magnetic tactile sensors. The attacker can alter the magnetic field, thus spoofing the force interpreted by magnetic tactile sensors. The attacker can stealthily deploy such an attack by simply attaching a thin (the thickness is around 0.5 mm), battery-free magnetic tag to the surface of an object. Hence, the attack tag can be easily concealed by a barcode sticker. Such an attac
Open source S3
- paper: not_reported
- code: not_reported
- weights: not_reported
- dataset: not_reported
Source excerpts and review record
Automatically extracted; no manual editorial approval recorded.
ss rate exceeding 95% when the grasping-position offset is bounded within 8 mm. Finally, based on the limitations of existing anti-magnetic interference mechanisms, we propose a multimodal-consistency defense mechanism to mitigate such physical-layer security threats.
Open source S6
physical loophole called PhantomTac in magnetic tactile sensors. The attacker can alter the magnetic field, thus spoofing the force interpreted by magnetic tactile sensors. The attacker can stealthily deploy such an attack by simply attaching a thin (the thickness is around 0.5 mm), battery-free magnetic tag to the surface of an object. Hence, the attack tag can be easily concealed by a barcode sticker. Such an attac
Open source S3
k scheme is "deploy-and-forget" -- the attacker can deploy the tag and leave. When a robotic hand is picking up an object, it may severely damage the object. Specifically, spoofing the normal force can crush the object, whereas spoofing the shear force can lead to a loose grip, thus dropping the object. Compared with directly sabotaging the robotic hand, PhantomTac is much more concealed as the attacker does not need
Open source S4
Source：arXiv Robotics — research abstracts · arxiv.org